

# PPPs and Port Investment: Back to Basics <sup>v1</sup>

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# CT Investment and PPPs in Transition?

- Looking back

- Globalisation will drive trade growth and CT's will secure robust traffic growth
- High barriers to entry
- CT's are not subject to regulatory intrusiveness
- PPPs preferred
- New *entry* into CT business – financial interests as owners – focus on deal structure and financial engineering

- Looking Forward

- Trade growth is maturing and also CT traffic growth: More attention to specific markets
  - Competition has been underestimated: Market and commercial risks higher than anticipated
  - Port performance a priority
  - Regulatory & planning risk remain
  - Re-thinking risk allocation
  - Focus on quality of asset
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

# 1. Market Changes: Demand




# Globalisation and PRC Exports

- Global container trade has been driven by the major east west trades linked to NA and European **consumption and import growth**
- PRC trade growth converts to a growing share of the container trade; displacing other exporters
- *Growth assumptions are now being challenged with recession and capital / credit market changes*
- CT growth going forward but new regional patterns
- Greater consideration of market risks – volume assumptions under review
- Re-thinking PPPs

## US & EU Merchandise Imports




## Even China has Stumbled



- Export & import typically >20% y-o-y most months, slowed starting 2H2008 to below -20% start of 2009
- **So much for “decoupling”**

# Unchartered waters




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## 2. Barriers to Entry: Supply






## Port Competition and Risk

- **Do CTs compete?**
  - Barriers to entry can be *lower* than assumed over the medium term
  - *Contested* hinterlands via high degrees of *inland connectivity* ...
  - **Yes ports compete!**
- **How do ports compete?**
  - Varies by market segment: deep – sea O/D, short sea and trans-shipment
  - Market size key (local O/D but critically driven by well connected hinterland)
  - Services (handling speeds, reliable berth windows)
  - *Pricing* often insufficient to overcome fundamentals
- **How are market changes shaping port competition and PPPs?**
  - Port customers are financially stressed & trying to restructure fleets and services: *downward pressure* on port tariffs
  - 10,000+ TEU ships are likely to result in fundamental shifts in port calls: *fewer* calls ?
  - Recognition that ports do not control key determinants of the port choice decision
  - **Risk of traffic and revenue growth divergence**





# Port Choice Determinants

Relative Weighting of Factor	Evidence Summary
<p>Market size and service factors 66 - 75%</p>  <p>Port cost (dues &amp; THCs) 25 - 33 %</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Port Choice is driven by the market size</b> - how much cargo there is to discharge / load is critical to the economic of a port call - hinterland connectivity is a key driver here</li> <li>• Shipping lines want fast handling speeds and reliable services - disruption to schedules is costly</li> <li>• Larger vessel sizes will strengthen the importance of market access/size and operational efficiency</li> </ul>
<p>Freight rates; inland transport and THCs 92 - 95 %</p>  <p>Port dues 5 - 8 %</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cost drivers considered by cargo owners tend to focus on <i>total through costs</i> of the end to end transport cost / port and route choice - of which <b>port dues are a modest part</b></li> <li>• Supply chain reliability is also important</li> </ul>
<p>85 - 90 % THCs</p>  <p>Port dues 10 - 15 %</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Of the port call costs the <b>THCs are a much more significant component of the cost structure than port dues</b> - these are determined by the stevedore and tend to reflect terms of concession agreements and market forces</li> </ul>



# Contested Hinterlands





## Demand and Supply Balances

- Demand and supply balances can shift and port competition can change growth patterns: Evidence from Europe / UK

*(Million TEU)*

Ports	1996	Share	2006	Share	Gain (+) vs Loss (-)	Growth 1996-2006 (% p.a.)
<b>NORTH WEST EUROPE</b>						
Rotterdam	4.97	30.3%	9.6	25.5%	-4.7%	6.80%
Hamburg	3.05	18.6%	8.86	23.6%	5.0%	11.25%
Antwerp	2.64	16.1%	7.01	18.7%	2.6%	10.26%
Bremerhaven	1.53	9.3%	4.45	11.8%	2.5%	11.27%
Le Havre	1.02	6.2%	2.13	5.7%	-0.5%	7.64%
Zeebrugge	0.33	2.0%	1.64	4.4%	2.4%	17.39%
<b>UK</b>						
Felixstowe	2.06	12.6%	2.73	7.3%	-5.3%	2.86%
Southampton	0.81	4.9%	1.16	3.1%	-1.8%	3.66%
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>16.41</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>37.58</b>	<b>100.0%</b>		

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Capacity	7,694	7,944	9,587	11,048	11,709	13,720	13,931	15,877
Demand (a)	7,462	5,693	6,024	6,486	6,971	7,476	7,942	8,435
Surplus/ Deficit	233	2,251	3,564	4,562	4,738	6,244	5,989	7,442



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## 3. Investment & Performance



# The World is not Flat



- **Old World**

- Variable performance across port ranges
  - TEU/m of quay – 3000 (Asia) to 1200 (Europe).
  - TEU/ha of CY – Far East (40K) vs Europe (20K)
  - Moves / crane hour: <20 to 35
- State funding to support CAPEX


- **New World**

- The major shipping lines are demanding performance gains
  - 30+ moves per crane hour : 200 moves/ship hr @ berth
  - Reliable berth windows and turnaround time
- Pressures to improve operational performance
- CAPEX Pressures to compete
  - 16 – 17m water depth + long straight quays (1200 – 2000 m) + land (25ha/400m berth) + inland connectivity
  - New pressures on private sector risk allocation via potential changes to state funding – push CAPEX onto operators



Productivity North America v Asia ... PPPs variable in achieving performance gains

**US West Coast**  
**LA Pier 400 – APM**  
 484 acre  
 Capacity 1.6m TEUs  
 3,300 TEUS / acre  
 (2005)



**Hong Kong**  
**Kwai Tsing Container Terminals**  
 704 acres  
 Capacity 18.3m TEUs  
 26,000 TEUs / acre  
 (2005)




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## 4. Policy, Finance and PPPs



# Forms of Private Sector Involvement



## Characteristics of PPP

- **Contract**
- **Sharing of risk & responsibility**
- **Medium to long term timescale**
- **Incentivised by having private finance at risk**





# Port PPP and Institutional Options

Name of Port(s)	Key Features
Hong Kong	Private Sector Operation, Construction and Financing under long-term concessions
Felixstowe	Privately owned and Managed.
Rotterdam	Landlord Port. Infrastructure developed by public sector, then leased to private operators, but public sector (RMPM) also involved in port operation
Shenzhen	Landlord port. Government has a financial share in the port. JVs in operations
LA / LB	Landlord port. Port Infrastructure developed by public sector, then leased to private operators.
Busan / Gwangyang	Landlord port. Infrastructure and some superstructure, developed by public sector, then leased to private operators. Korean Container Terminal Authority also operates. Newer CTs developed as BOTs
Singapore	Ownership, operation and development of facilities under public sector body (PSA) – proposed changes (IPO) delayed



## Policy and Regulatory Influences

- Ports have become subject to a different form of regulatory risk
  - Price caps and other controls limited
  - Planning & environmental clearances and approvals a key risk factor
  - Pressure to allocate *external* costs onto ports (e.g. UK London Gateway (£100mn) & Felixstowe (£150mn))
- Landlord port models prevalent
  - ITOs and shipping lines major players
  - Balance competition requirements & excess capacity risks
- **Concessions a primary instrument of PPP/PSP**
  - Bids based on royalty and performance pledges (MAGs)
  - Degree of pricing freedom
  - More transparency, less negotiated
  - **Changes in risk allocation:** Shift to operators building quays and supplying equipment
  - Concession length reflects investment needs ... longer duration (20+ yrs)





## Port PPPs: Back to Basics

- **Growth Story: A time for realism**
  - Port traffic assumptions likely to be less backward looking; stronger cyclical effects than perhaps first assumed: Greater attention on market fundamentals
- **Barriers to Entry: Competition matters**
  - New port choices, contested hinterlands and supply elasticity (new build & productivity improvements): Paying attention to competition drivers
  - Volume & pricing assumptions more modest and thus PPP rent sharing
- **Risk Allocation: Shift to private sector**
  - Desire to allocation greater risks onto private sector in PPPs ... however this requires clear policy goals and stable regulation
  - More demanding capital markets and less access to (cheap) credit – focus on performance to meet financial metrics ... new build more critically assessed
  - Greater consideration of cost recovery of port infrastructure investment (e.g. changing EU state aid application)
  - From the deal / financial structure to quality of the asset





Thank you

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